The finance literature documents the relation between labor income and the crosssection of stock returns. A possible explanation is the hedging of investors with relative wealth concerns who pay a premium for securities that help them to keep up with their peers. Relative wealth concerns imply a local effect and a negative risk premium associated with the risk factor, since investors are willing to overpay for securities that help their hedging goals. We find evidence that is consistent with these regularities. In addition, we show that the effect varies across geographic areas depending on the size and variability of the risk factor -undiversifiable wealth, proxied by labor income.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a channel that can explain the relationship between labor income and the cross-section of stock returns. In particular, the optimal hedging strategy of investors with relative wealth concerns results in a multifactor equilibrium model in which the undiversified wealth of the "peers" (for which we argue labor income is a good proxy) is priced. In addition, the risk premium associated to this factor is negative.
Over the years, the finance literature has accumulated evidence of a connection between labor income and the cross-section of stock returns. Mayers (1972) is credited as the first to suggest the analysis of labor income as a measure of human capital in an asset pricing setting. In two influential papers, Campbell (1996) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) use growth in labor income as a measure of the return on human capital. Their intuition is that human capital, a fundamental part of the economy's endowment, has been typically overlooked in the CAPM. The inclusion of the return to human capital in empirical asset pricing models is able to explain a much higher portion of the cross-sectional variation in stock returns relative to the standard CAPM. Ludvigson (2001a and 2001b) and Santos and Veronesi (2006) both introduce labor income based variables into conditional asset pricing models and find that the explanatory power of the model increases substantially.
In this paper, we consider a channel for the interaction between returns on human capital and the cross-section of stock returns different from the market completeness argument in Campbell (1996) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) or the time varying risk premium arguments in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) and Santos and Veronesi (2006) . Specifically, the empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that labor income is related to the cross-section of stock returns through the hedging activity of investors with relative wealth concerns. This idea is based on the KEEping up Pricing Model (KEEPM) of relative wealth concerns developed in Gómez, Priestley and Zapatero (2009) . In this model investors hedge the risk that their reference group ("peers") will experience an income shock by investing in securities strongly correlated with the income of these peers. Equilibrium prices reflect the price pressure resulting from the hedging activities of investors with relative wealth concerns.
Relative wealth concerns imply restrictions on the relationship between human capital and stock returns not previously identified in the literature on this topic: i) the risk premium associated with the labor income factor (positive correlation between labor income and security returns) is negative, since investors are willing to pay extra for securities that hedge this risk; ii) this connection must hold at the local level, since the main source of relative wealth concerns pertains to the surroundings of the investor.
In this paper we test both of the previous implications of the KEEPM using US data. To test ii), the local nature of the relative wealth concerns effect, it is critical to choose the right geographic unit. To prove this case beyond any reasonable doubt, we use individual 1 securities and their relationship to the smallest unit for which we have disaggregated labor income, the state. We perform time-series analysis and construct factor-mimicking portfolio for cross-section tests, which we augment with the Fama-French factors. The data strongly support the implications of the model.
We perform similar tests, and corroborate the previous results, at the US Census divisions level. 1 In addition, given the larger size of the divisions (some states have a low GDP and few stocks) we can perform further qualitative analysis. In particular, it is intuitive -we prove this formally-that the hedging demand will be higher the higher the volatility of the factor investors want to hedge and the higher the importance -size-of that factor. Our tests show, in effect, that the size of the premium associated with the risk factor can be explained across divisions by the size and volatility of the factor in each division.
Finally, to double-check the local nature of the risk factor, we jointly test the local (state or division) factor and the aggregate (country) factor. Gómez, Priestley and Zapatero (2009) shows that the country factor is priced. In this paper we show that when we include both the country and the local (divisional or state) factors, both are priced and their risk premium is negative. This is further evidence that the risk factor has a local nature, as the KEEPM model implies.
The literature has discussed two main sources of relative wealth concerns. On one hand, Keeping Up with the Joneses preferences, first introduced in the finance literature by Abel (1990) and further analyzed by Galí (1994) , who shows that in the absence of a market friction, optimal portfolio holdings are identical across investors and only market risk is priced in equilibrium. Brown, Ivković, Smith and Weisbenner (2008) find evidence consistent with keeping up with the Joneses behavior in stock market participation: individual market participation increases with average community market participation. On the other hand, DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) present a model of endogenous, price-driven relative wealth concerns; this principle is then applied to financial bubbles in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2008) and technological investment and investment cycles in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2008) . Evidence of relative wealth concerns is presented in Ravina (2005) . Gómez (2007) analyzes the impact of relative wealth concerns on portfolio choice. García and Strobl (2011) study the implications for information acquisition.
Our paper is very related to Korniotis (2008) . He considers a consumption-based model of external habit formation as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) for different partitions of the US (the four US census regions and eight BEA regions). He finds strong empirical support for the model. It also falls -and so does this paper-in the spirit of the literature that arguably starts with Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) and presents evidence of the fragmentation of the US securities market. The last paper shows that the cross-section of stock returns depends on the census division where the headquarters of the firm are located. The growing literature in this line of research includes Korniotis and Kumar (2008) and Bernile, Korniotis, Kumar and Wang (2011) who show the connection between stock returns and local economic conditions. Finally, although we do not perform any direct test on portfolio holdings in this paper, the KEEPM yields partial equilibrium results that are consistent with those in the home bias literature. This influential area of research started with French and Poterba (1991) , who uncovered the so-called "home bias puzzle." This refers to the finding that investors over-invest in domestic stocks relative to the optimal global risk-diversification level. 2 . Subsequently, a strand of the literature has shown a similar effect at the domestic level, the "home bias at home." Coval and Moskowitz (1999) , for instance, study the investment behavior of money managers and observe that they favor (with respect to what would be optimal) local firms. Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) and Massa and Simonov (2006) show that US and Swedish households, respectively, exhibit a strong preference for local investments. Their empirical tests seem to suggest that investors exploit local information to obtain higher returns. In our setting, investors in a given location (state or division) are willing to pay a premium for assets positively correlated with the divisional, non-diversifiable wealth. Our tests show that after taking into account the hedging properties of local (same division) assets, assets from other divisions can only offer very marginal extra hedging. This would reinforce the assumption of locally biased portfolio holdings. However, we often observe some local assets commanding a negative correlation with the proxy for relative wealth concerns. This has an interesting implication: investors seem willing to short local (same division) stocks that covary negatively with local labor income. Notice that this is consistent with a (Joneses) hedging argument as opposed to a familiarity argument -see, for instance, Huberman (2001)where investors hold only long positions on local stocks.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the theory and derive the KEEPM in section 2. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. In section 4 we perform our baseline tests at the aggregate level, pooling all securities in the tests. In section 5 we perform similar tests at the US census divisional level. We then redo the basic tests using aggregate labor income (instead of state labor income) as a proxy for undiversifiable wealth in section 6. Section 7 offers some final remarks and closes the paper.
The KEEPM
We consider the two main specifications discussed in the literature: exogenous and endogenous keeping up with the Joneses preferences. In both specifications, we assume a one-period economy with K divisions denoted by k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}. In each division there is a local firm. At time t = 0, each firm issues one share that will yield a random payoff in time t = 1. We normalize the initial value of the firm to 1. Let r k denote the random excess return on a share of firm k. The vector r = (r 1 , ..., r k , ..., r K ) has a joint distribution function F (r), with mean return vector E(r) and covariance matrix Ω. Firm shares can be freely traded across divisions. There is also a risk-free bond in zero net supply. Let R denote the return on the risk-free bond. Financial markets are assumed to be complete.
In each division there are two types of agents: "investors" and "workers," who are endowed with non-diversifiable stochastic local labor or entrepreneurial income.
The Appendix shows (see equations (A3) and (A5)) that, whether endogenous or exogenous, the existence of keeping up with the Joneses behavior and non-diversifiable income implies the following optimal portfolio for the representative investor in division k:
where X w k represents a mimicking portfolio that maps the workers endowment return onto the investment opportunity set; θ k denotes the the relative wealth at t = 0 of the division's workers as a proportion of the total division's wealth. The parameters b and τ represent the portfolio bias and the risk-tolerance coefficient, respectively, with values:
Notice that, given these definitions, there will exist a bias in portfolio holdings towards the Joneses portfolio (hence, consumption) only if 0 < γ < 1, in the exogenous specification, and α > 1, in the endogenous specification. 3 Market clearing in financial markets at time t = 0 requires that k ω k x * k = x M , with x M the market portfolio, with excess return r M , and ω k = c 0 k / k c 0 k . Spot market clearing at time t = 1 implies that workers consume the proceedings of their (non-tradable) endowment, w, and investors the return on their portfolios, c.
We regress the workers non-diversifiable wealth return, r w k = r X w , onto the country market portfolio excess return:
Portfolio β k x M represents the projection of the workers income onto the security market line spanned by the aggregate market portfolio x M . Define the portfolio F k ≡ X w k − β k x M as an orthogonal factor portfolio with return r F k = r F k and mean return µ F k . After these definitions, the workers' portfolio can be expressed as a linear combination of the market portfolio and a zero-beta (orthogonal) portfolio: X w k = F k + β k x M . We replace X w k in (1):
This portfolio has three components. Portfolio F k is division-specific and can be interpreted as a hedge portfolio: for each division k, portfolio F k hedges investors from the risk involved in keeping up with the local non-diversifiable Joneses risk. Given the orthogonality conditions, this portfolio plays the role of a division-specific, zero-beta asset. The projection component, β k x M , corresponds to that part of the workers wage income perfectly correlated with the country market portfolio. The standard component, Ω −1 E(r), is the highest global Sharpe ratio portfolio and it is common across divisions.
We define the coefficient H as the inverse of the risk-tolerance coefficient H −1 = k ω k τ k . After imposing market clearing, we solve for equilibrium expected returns:
Define the matrix F of dimension N ×(K +1) as the column juxtaposition of the market portfolio and the orthogonal portfolios,
.., r F K ) denote the vector of factor returns. Additionally, define the wealth vector as
Given these definitions, the equilibrium condition (3) can be re-written as E(r) = Ω F W .
Pre-multiplying both terms of the previous equation by the transpose of matrix F we obtain the equilibrium condition for the vector of prices of risk, λ ≡ (λ M , λ 1 , ..., λ k , ..., λ K ), with the market risk premium, λ M , as the first component. Thus, λ = F Ω F W , where F Ω F is a matrix of dimension (K +1)×(K +1) whose first column (row) includes the market return volatility and a vector of K zeros and the remaining elements are the covariances between F k and F k for all k, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}.
The expected risk premia on the market and the zero-beta portfolios will be:
for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}.
The market portfolio, x M , is partially correlated with each division's non-diversifiable risk. This correlation is captured by the coefficient β k and offers partial hedging against deviations from the local Joneses (in case θb > 0). Therefore, the equilibrium price of risk for the country market risk factor, λ M , varies relative to the symmetric equilibrium. The parenthesis in the first equation in (4) , which in the case of a symmetric equilibrium would be 1, captures the net price of risk on the aggregate market risk factor, after discounting the (capitalization weighted) Joneses hedging effect. If the weighted value of the betas is higher than the country market beta (i.e., 1), the model predicts that the market price of risk could turn negative. Intuitively, if the hedging properties of the market portfolio against Joneses deviations outweigh the compensation for systematic risk the net expected market price of risk becomes negative.
More importantly, if there is a relative wealth concern (b > 0) in the economy (either endogenous or exogenous) and workers income is not diversifiable (θ > 0), there should be K additional risk factors (one per division) together with the market risk factor. Regarding their sign, the model predicts that if cov(r F k , r F k ) > 0 for all k, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}, then every λ k will be negative. 4 To understand this result, suppose for the moment that the zero-beta portfolios were orthogonal (Cov(r F k , r F k ) = 0) for all k, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}. Then, the price of risk would be easily isolated and strictly negative. The intuition for the negative sign would be as follows: An asset that has positive covariance with portfolio F k will hedge the investor in division k from the risk of deviating from the non-diversifiable (local) income of the Joneses. This investor will be willing to pay a higher price for the asset thus yielding a lower return. In equilibrium, the price of risk for F k would be, in absolute terms, increasing in b k and the volatility of the hedge portfolio. If the covariance across zero-beta portfolios is positive, this just increases the absolute value of the negative prices of risk for every division's hedge portfolio.
Solving for W we obtain:
where β F = Ω F (F Ω F ) −1 denotes the K ×(K +1), in general, for N assets, N ×(K +1), matrix of betas, with the first column as the market betas for all assets.
This pricing model that captures the equilibrium implications of keeping up with the Joneses preferences, both under the exogenous and endogenous specifications, is termed the KEEPM, which stands for "KEEping up Pricing Model". In the following sections, we test the models' restrictions on the prices of risk in (4) and the cross-section performance of the equilibrium condition (5).
Data description
Testing the implications of the KEEPM in equations (4) and (5) requires, in the first place, to select the risk factors and the test assets. In this section, we describe the procedures and data used to this end.
In order to construct the risk factors that will proxy relative wealth concerns, it is necessary to make some assumptions regarding the geographical dimension of "the peers". For example, should they be defined at the city, state, division, region or national level? Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) show that the probability of local bias in an investor's portfolio holdings increases the closer the investor is geographically to the company's headquarters. Even at the Census division level the bias in portfolio holdings is both economic and statistically significant: the probability of holding a stock headquartered in the same division is higher than the unconditional probability of holding any given stock. 5 Our choice regarding the geographical dimension of the peers builds on the same intuition. Arguably, the relevance of keeping up with the Joneses should be higher (larger γ in the model) at the state level. From CRSP, we obtain stock returns for all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks from 1960Q1 to 2011Q4. From COMPUSTAT, we obtain annual information on headquarter location, market capitalization and book value of equity for the period 1963 to 2011. Using the information on headquarters location in COMPUSTAT, each firm is assigned to a state (we exclude firms located in Hawaii and Alaska). For each stock, we proxy local non-diversifiable wealth using personal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) corresponding to the state where the company's headquarters are located. Following Santos and Veronesi (2006) , we calculate the return on personal income per capita in quarter t by dividing the difference in personal income between quarter t and quarter t − 1 by the personal income in quarter t − 1, all per capita. Following equation (2) in the model, for each state s we regress the return on state level personal income per capita on the CRSP aggregate stock market excess return and use the residuals from this regression as the orthogonal return on state labor income, denoted by r F s . As a robustness test, we will replace the state labor income with the divisional labor income. We calculate per capita personal income data at the divisional level aggregating state personal income within the division and dividing it by the division's annual population as reported in the U.S. Census Bureau. Following the same orthogonalization procedure we obtain for each division k the time series of orthogonal divisional labor income return, denoted by r F k . Finally, in order to compare the local versus country effect of the Joneses behavior, we calculate the US country labor income per capita. The corresponding orthogonal country labor income return is denoted by r C .
Regarding the test assets, the model will be tested using individual assets and assets sorted into portfolios. Using individual assets, we will test in the first place the cross-sectional predictions of the model at the aggregate country level. This implies using all US individual stocks jointly, regardless of their headquarters location, as test assets. This approach presumes that the price of risk associated to the non-diversifiable labor income risk is the same across all states and divisions in the US. To explore the potential regional differences in the intensity of the Joneses effect, we will also test the model division by division.
To compare the performance of our model with other standard models in the literature (notably, the CAPM and and three-factor Fama and French model), we will replace the individual stocks with portfolios. At the same time, we will construct factor mimicking portfolios for the orthogonal labor income risk, both in the aggregate and divisional tests. In addition to the local risk factors, we also require the excess return on the aggregate stock market portfolio (erm), as proxied by the CRSP aggregate index, the small minus big market capitalization portfolio (smb) and the high minus low book to market portfolio (hml). All these portfolios are taken from the web site of Kenneth French. The quarterly premia on erm, smb and hml are 1.50%, 1.07% and 1.07% respectively, over the sample period.
Aggregate tests
Our first test of the model will assume that the price of risk for the local orthogonal labor income risk is unique across states and divisions. This is a strong assumption that will be relaxed in the following section where the tests will be conducted division by division. The aggregate tests in this section will offer the first evidence in favor of the model's main testable prediction, namely, a negative negative price of risk on the orthogonal state labor income return. We will compare the cross-sectional performance of our model relative to the performance of other established asset pricing models in the literature. We describe next the procedure followed to test the model using both individual stocks and portfolios.
Individual stocks
Starting in 1960, we use five years of quarterly data and regress the return on every individual stock i in the US on a constant, the orthogonal state labor income return, r F s,t , and the CRSP aggregate stock market excess return, r erm : 6
We then add one year of quarterly data and re-estimate the coefficients. The estimated betas,β F i andβ erm i , are assumed to be constant in each quarter within the year. We keep on 6 We assume that a firm that is headquartered in state s in 1963 is headquartered in that state in 1960, 1961 and 1962.
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adding on year of quarterly returns and re-estimate the orthogonal beta and the market beta until we complete thirty-six quarters. After that point, every time a new year of quarterly data is added, the first (oldest) year is removed and the process is repeated. The time series of quarterly estimated rolling betas starts in 1965Q1 and ends in 2011Q4.
Using this time series of quarterly betas we estimate, quarter by quarter, the contemporaneous price of risk on the state orthogonal labor income factor:
Table 1 presents the average prices of risk λ 0 , λ F and λ erm . Absolute t-values are reported in parenthesis. As predicted by the model, the average price of risk on the orthogonal labor income risk is negative and strongly significant with an absolute t-value equal to 2.27. The quarterly size of the orthogonal risk premium is economically significant at -0.198% (approximately -0.8% per year). 7
Portfolios
We construct first a factor mimicking (FM) portfolio for the orthogonal state labor income risk as follows.
For each stock i, we use the slope coefficient on the orthogonal labor factor,β F i , estimated in (6) until the fourth quarter of 1964 to rank stocks in 1965. Next, we form three equally weighted portfolios according to the size of the coefficient. We then add one year of quarterly data. We re-estimate the coefficient, rank the stocks, sort them into three portfolios and compute their quarterly returns in 1966. We continue adding one year and re-estimating the coefficients until we have thirty-six quarterly observations in the time-series regressions. At this point, we start rolling the data one year at a time: adding on a new year and taking off the first year. We continue this process until the end of the sample.
The above procedure provides three portfolios from the first quarter of 1965 to the final quarter of 2011 which are formed in year t based on the estimated coefficient on orthogonal labor income estimated until year t − 1. The returns on the factor mimicking portfolio are computed as the returns of the portfolio (P1) formed by the stocks with the highest one third of coefficient estimates minus the returns on the portfolio (P3) formed by the stocks with the lowest one third of coefficient estimates. We denote r F M t the time-series return on the state factor mimicking portfolio.
The next step involves forming test portfolios based on the sorted orthogonal betas from individual stocks estimated in (6) . Daniel and Titman (2005) and Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) note that testing asset pricing models using portfolios formed on firm characteristics, such as size and book to market, can lead to spurious conclusions about the use-fulness of a proposed factor. The reason for this is that the factor structure of the portfolios is so strong that any proposed factor that is only weakly correlated with size or book-to-market will appear to price the test assets. That is, testing a new proposed factor on test assets sorted only by size and book-to-market is likely to have very low power. In order to alleviate this concern we follow the recommendations in Daniel and Titman (2005) and Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) and sort stocks by lagged loadings on our proposed factor. We will use these beta-sorted portfolios together with the twenty-five Fama and French portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market in the cross-sectional tests of our model.
To generate the beta-sorted test portfolios we repeat the procedure discussed above and construct ten and twenty equally weighted portfolios. 8 We calculate excess returns on all the test portfolios by subtracting the one month T-bill rate from the actual returns. Table 2 Panel A shows the average return spread between the portfolio containing the stocks with the highest orthogonal betas (P1) and the portfolio containing the stocks with the lowest orthogonal betas (P3, P10 and P20, respectively). Notice that, consistently with the model's prediction, portfolios with higher orthogonal beta carry a lower return relative to portfolios with lower orthogonal beta. This difference is economically significant and above 1% per quarter. We test whether the difference between both portfolios is different from zero. In the first two cases (P1-P3 and P1-P10) we strongly reject that the difference in zero. In the third case (P1-P20) we can only reject it marginally.
In Table 2 Panel B we present the average return on each of the twenty beta-sorted portfolios and the correlation coefficient between each portfolio and the factor mimicking portfolio. Notice that as we move from top to bottom in the table, the average return on the portfolios increases while the correlation decreases. That is, portfolios more correlated with the factor mimicking portfolio offer a better hedging against deviations from the Joneses consumption (including non-diversifiable wealth) and trade at a higher price (lower expected return). The coefficientβ F M p in the last column is obtained by regressing the return on each of the portfolios against the return on the factor mimicking portfolio and the market excess return:
Similar to the correlation, the estimated coefficient decreases as we move from the top (P1) to the bottom (P20) portfolio. All but the three top betas are strongly significant.
After studying the time-series properties of the twenty beta-sorted test portfolios, we analyze the cross-sectional performance of the KEEPM. As test assets we will use the twenty beta-sorted portfolios plus the twenty-five Fama and French portfolios sorted first by size from smaller (FF1) to larger (FF21) and sorted then within each quintile by book-to-market from lower to higher. As independent variables we will use the portfolio betas on the factor mimicking portfolio based on the orthogonal state labor income return,β F M p , and the stock market return,β erm p , estimated in (8): 9
The results from this cross-sectional regression are reported in Table 2 Panel A.1. The quarterly price of risk on the orthogonal factor mimicking portfolio is negative (-0.88%) and statistically significant at the 2.5%. The regression adjustedR 2 = 66%. 10 Notice that the intercept is strongly significant, which indicates that the model is not correctly specified. It will be interesting to compare this value with the intercept estimated in the cross-sectional regressions per division, where the intercept will turn non-significant in all cases. For comparison, Panel A.2 reports the price of risk, λ erm , and the average adjusted R 2 from the cross-sectional regression of the CAPM. As in previous tests of the unconditional CAPM, the estimated price of risk is statistically not different from zero and the average adjusted R 2 = 8% is very small. Panel A.3 presents the three-factor Fama and French cross-sectional test. Both the size, λ smb , and book-to-market, λ hml , prices of risk are positive and statistically different from zero. The average R 2 = 73% is similar to the value from the KEEPM.
We add, for robustness, the size and book-to market risk factors to the KEEPM in Panel A.4. The time series regression (8) is augmented with the return on the small-minuslarge (sml) and high-minus-low (hml) portfolios from the Fama and French model. The corresponding betas,β smb p andβ hml p , are estimated for each portfolio. These betas are then added to the cross-sectional test in (9):
The price of risk on the orthogonal factor mimicking portfolio is -0.896, virtually identical to the original value reported in Panel A.1, and also significant at the 2.5%. The premia on both the size and book-to-market factors remain positive and significant like in Panel A.3, although the size risk premium is smaller. The cross-sectional explanatory power of the test remains very close, at 75%. We interpret these findings as evidence that the model's prediction of a negative price of risk on the Joneses risk-hedging factor remains robust to the inclusion of other risk factors known for their ability to explain the cross-section of the US stock returns. In the light of the results in Panel A.4 we feel confident that the orthogonal 9 All cross-sectional results are qualitatively analogous when the prices of risk are estimated with respect to the one-year lagged betas. 10 labor income factor commands a price for risk not explained by the size and book-to-market risk premia.
To test the pricing performance of the KEEPM relative to the CAPM and the three-factor Fama and French model, Panel B presents the square root of the squared pricing errors for each test portfolio and each model. We define the pricing error of a given portfolio as the difference between the actual portfolio return and the expected return according to the crosssectional model. Looking at the pricing errors from the KEEPM, overall, the size is small relative to the portfolio returns in Table 2 Panel B. In particular, the average pricing error is 0.287%, about ten times smaller than the average portfolio return. The pricing errors from the CAPM are, as expected, larger relative to those of the other models, with an average value of 0.483. Comparing the pricing errors of the KEEPM with those of the three-factor Fama and French model, they are of similar magnitude (the average value is 0.241) and smaller in eight out of the twenty-five Fama and French portfolios (Panel B.1) and eleven out of the twenty beta-sorted portfolios (Panel B.2). When we add the size and book-to-market risk factors to the KEEPM in the last column, the average pricing error decreases to 0.222 and the pricing errors are smaller than those from the three-factor model for eleven of the Fama and French portfolios and thirteen of the beta-sorted portfolios.
Panel B.3 includes the average cross-sectional pricing errors from each model for the fortyfive portfolios from panels B.1 and B.2. We also report a test of whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. 11 Except for the three-factor Fama and French model, the test rejects the hypothesis that the pricing errors are jointly zero. It is interesting to compare these results with the cross-sectional tests performed division per division and reported in Table 6 . As we will discuss later, the tests at the divisional level cannot reject the null hypothesis that the pricing errors are jointly zero.
The evidence presented so far shows a strong support at the aggregate level for the model's prediction: a negative and significant price of risk on the orthogonal state labor income return factor as a proxy for the risk of deviating from the Joneses local consumption. In the timeseries, the test portfolios behave as expected and their betas with respect to the orthogonal factor mimicking portfolio are strongly significant in most cases. In the cross-sectional tests, the KEEPM performs reasonably well in comparison to the three-factor Fama and French model and the orthogonal factor mimicking portfolio is shown to be robust to the inclusion of the size and book-to-market risk factors.
Tests per division
In this section we repeat the tests from the previous section, both with individual stocks and portfolios, at the divisional level. The objective is to test if the intensity of keeping up with the Joneses varies across US divisions and whether this is reflected in the size of the orthogonal labor income price risk in a way consistent with the model's predictions.
Every state belongs to one of the nine Census Bureau divisions which we index with two capital letters: West South Central (WS), Pacific (PA), East South Central (ES), Mountain (MO), East North Central (EN), South Atlantic (SA), West North Central (WN), Middle Atlantic (MA), and New England (NE). These divisions are grouped into four regions: West, Midwest, Northeast and South.
Individual stocks
Stocks are first sorted into divisions according to the location of the company's headquarters. We then follow the same procedure explained in Section 4.1 and estimate, for each stock in the division, the betas with respect to the orthogonal state labor income and the US stock market beta from equation (6) . We then run the contemporaneous Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression at each quarter t from 1965Q1 through 2011Q4 using as dependent variable the stock return and as independent variables the estimated orthogonal,β F i , and market,β erm i , betas. The only difference with respect to the cross-sectional tests in the previous section is that we use only stocks headquartered within each division. In particular, for each division k we run the following cross-sectional regression: for each division k. All the orthogonal prices of risk are negative and significant at least at the 5% level (with the exception of MA, only marginally significant at the 10%). In the cases of SA, PA, ES and MO the price of risk is statistical significant at least at the 2.5% level, with SA and PA significant at the 0.5% level. In terms of size, there is a wide discrepancy across divisions: from the smallest, in absolute value, in MA (-0.165) to the largest in MO (-0.324).
In order to test the robustness of our findings to the restriction of using only stocks within the division, we replace the orthogonal state labor income, r F s , with the orthogonal divisional labor income, r F k . We then run, for each division, the time series regression (6) for every stock in the US, regardless of the location of the company's headquarters. We estimate the corresponding betas with respect to the orthogonal divisional labor income and the market. Table 4 . The price of risk on the orthogonal factors is, overall, very similar compared to Panel A. In the case of MA, ES and MO the price of risk increases, in absolute terms, marginally (more notably in ES) whereas in EN and WN it decreases, remaining practically the same in the other divisions. These differences can be understood as follows. Arguably, as reasoned in Section 3, the relevance of keeping up with the Joneses should be higher (larger γ in the model) at the state level. On the other side, as it is clear from equation (4), the size of the orthogonal price of risk depends on the volatility of the "local" (i.e. divisional) orthogonal factor and the weighted covariance with the orthogonal factors from other divisions. Insofar these factors are correlated, holding or shorting stocks from other divisions may affect the average orthogonal price of risk. These two effects, the higher relevance of the Joneses behavior at the state level versus the hedging effect of cross-divisional demand, partially compensate each other. Comparing Panels A and B in Table 4 shows that the net effect varies across divisions although it is, on average, very small. These results suggest that most of the hedging against the risk of deviating from the local Joneses consumption comes from the stocks more closely located to the source of non-diversifiable labor income, consistent with the documented home-bias at home in the US portfolio holdings (Coval and Moskowitz (1998) and Brown at al. (2008)).
Portfolios
We construct now a factor mimicking (FM) portfolio for the orthogonal state labor income risk in each division following the same procedure described in Section 4.2. We sort stocks within each division into three equally portfolios each year t from the first quarter of 1965 to the final quarter of 2011 based on the coefficient on orthogonal labor income,β F i , estimated until year t − 1. The returns on the factor mimicking portfolio are computed as the returns of the portfolio (P1) formed by the stocks with the highest one third of coefficient estimates minus the returns on the portfolio (P3) formed by the stocks with the lowest one third of coefficient estimates. We denote r F M k,t the time-series return on the state factor mimicking portfolio in division k.
Likewise, to generate the beta-sorted test portfolios we repeat the procedure discussed above and construct ten equally weighted portfolios per division. We calculate excess returns on all the test portfolios by subtracting the one month T-bill rate from the actual returns. Table 5 Panel A reports the average spread return between portfolio P1 and, respectively, portfolio P3 and portfolio P10 for each division. All spreads are negative. Looking at P1-P3 first, the spreads are not uniform in size across divisions. They range from -0.229 in NE to -2.081 in PA. In four out of the nine divisions (MA, PA, ES and WS) the spread is different from zero at least at the 5% confidence level (at the 0.5% level in the case of PA and WS). When we analyze P1-P10, the spread increases in (absolute) size for all divisions except PA, where it marginally decreases. In Panel B we recalculate the spreads replacing the orthogonal divisional by the state labor income return and using, in each division, all US stocks regardless of their headquarters location. The effect varies from division to division. Looking first at the P1-P3, compared to Panel A, the spreads increase in all divisions except in PA, ES and WS, where they decrease although they still remain strongly significant. All spreads are now statistically significant at least at the 5% level. When we compare P1-P10 with P1-P3 in Panel B, the spreads increase in (absolute) size in all divisions.
In Panel C we report the excess returns for each portfolio in each division. The portfolios in this panel have been created by sorting stocks within each division with respect to the coefficientβ F i estimated with respect to the orthogonal state labor income return. Virtually all returns are strongly different from zero and they tend to increase in size as we move from P1 to P10. Panel D reports, for each division k and each portfolio p, the coefficient with respect to the orthogonal state labor income factor mimicking portfolio, r F M k,t , estimated in the following regression:
Most of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. They decrease is size as we move from portfolios with higher covariance with the orthogonal state labor income (P1) to portfolios with lower covariance (P10). This, together with the negative price of risk on the orthogonal risk factor reported in Table 6 implies that portfolios more correlated with the orthogonal state labor income will carry a lower expected return relative to portfolios less correlated since they offer better hedging against deviations from the Joneses consumption.
We study now the cross-sectional performance of the KEEPM division per division. In each division k we run the following contemporaneous cross-sectional regression each quarter t from 1965Q1 until 2011Q4 for the ten portfolios sorted by the orthogonal state labor income beta analyzed in Table 5 :
where the coefficientsβ F M p,k andβ erm p,k have been estimated in the time-series regression (11) . The results are reported in Table 6 Panel B. Notice first that the estimated constant coefficient λ 0 k is not statistically different from zero in any division. This is in contrast with the estimated constant coefficient in the aggregate cross-sectional test reported in Table 3 Panel A.1. We interpret this as evidence in favor of a better model specification of the KEEPM at the divisional relative to the aggregate level. Qualitatively, the estimated prices of risk, λ F M k , are very similar to the P1-P3 spreads reported in Table 5 Panel A. They are all negative, as predicted by the model. They range from -0.101 in EN to -1.812 in PA. Five out of the nine risk premia are significant at leat at the 5% confidence level (at the 0.5% level in the case of PA and WS).
The variation in the size of prices of risk among divisions is consistent with the model's prediction. To see this notice that, ignoring the covariance terms, the value of the price of risk on the orthogonal labor income return is, according to (4), a function of three factors. In the first place the proportion of local non-diversifiable wealth in the division, ω k θ k ; in the second term the Joneses preference parameter, γ k ; finally, the variance of the orthogonal labor income return, var(r F k ). Figure 2 presents a map with the distribution, in percentage, of the personal income across US states from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). There is a high concentration of non-diversifiable wealth (proxied in our tests by personal income) in certain states and divisions. PA, MA, EN, SA and WS are the divisions with a higher concentration of personal income. On the other side, MO, WN, NE and ES are the divisions with a lower concentration. Clearly, the Joneses parameter is not directly observable. Moreover, we do not have any reason to believe that it may be different across divisions. Finally, Table 6 Panel A shows the variance of the divisional factor mimicking portfolios in the diagonal. There is wide heterogeneity in volatility across divisions. Any variation in the price of risk across divisions should be explained, according to the model, by the interaction between the percentage of labor income wealth in the division and the volatility of the orthogonal divisional factor. As an heuristic test we see that divisions with high factor volatility like PA (0.86%), ES (0.83%), WS (0.83%) and MO (0.89%) exhibit the largest (absolute) orthogonal prices of risk in Panel B. Within these divisions, PA (-1.812%) and WS (-1.805%) have the absolute largest premia, and they are both strongly significant at the 0.5% confidence level. Notice that both divisions comprise states with a high concentration of personal income. On the other side, ES (-1.456%) and MO (-1.193%) have relatively smaller premia, significant at the 5% only in the case of MO. From Figure 2 we can see that both divisions include states with low concentration of personal income.
Among the rest of divisions, some of them have either low factor volatility like NE (0.33%) and EN (0.22%) or a small concentration of personal income like WN. MA (0.37%) and SA (0.59%) have relatively low factor volatility but both divisions include states with high concentration of population density. This may explain why their (absolute) prices of risk are relatively large in comparison with other divisions with similar factor volatility but lower concentration of personal income.
The last three columns in Table 5 Panel B.1 report, for each division, the cross-sectional regression adjusted R 2 , the average pricing errors and the test on whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. R 2 ranges from 17% for NE to 92% for WS. In all divisions with high factor mimicking variance (PA, ES, WS and MO) the cross-sectional power of the test is above 60%. The prices of error are small relative to the average portfolio return reported in Table 5 Panel B. In all cases the test rejects the null hypothesis that these pricing errors are different from zero. It is worth noting that when the same test was performed at the aggregate level (for all US beta-sorted portfolios simultaneously) the null hypothesis could not be rejected. We interpret this evidence as support for the KEEPM model at the local level where we allow for the price of risk on the orthogonal factor mimicking portfolio to vary across divisions. Finally, in Panel B.2, we repeat the cross-sectional tests in (12) including the size, λ smb k , and book-to-market, λ hml k , risk factors in each division according to the following crosssectional test: 
Country-wide orthogonal income
In this section we compare the cross-sectional power of the KEEPM when the orthogonal state labor income return that proxies for the local non-diversifiable wealth is replaced with the orthogonal US country labor income return. We will also include both the state and country orthogonal risk factors simultaneously in the cross-sectional test. Gómez, Priestly and Zapatero (2009) showed in an international version of the model that the orthogonal US country labor income return carries a negative price of risk. The evidence reported so far in this paper points in the direction of a local hedging demand that varies across divisions.
Our objective is to compare the divisional and country performance of the KEEPM and test whether the variation in the prices of risk across divisions persist after considering jointly local and country risk factors. We denote r C t the orthogonal country labor income return. We follow the same procedure explained in Section 4.1. For each individual stock i in the US we estimate the rolling betas with respect to the orthogonal country labor income return and the US stock market return:
The slope coefficientsβ C i andβ erm i are estimated for every stock in the US. The time series of quarterly estimated betas starts in 1965Q1 and ends in 2011Q4. We then run the contemporaneous Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions at each period t:
Panel A reports the average (percentage) prices of risk λ 0 , λ C and λ erm . The quarterly price of risk on the orthogonal labor income return is -0.241% and significant at the 1%. This is consistent with the evidence in Gómez, Priestley and Zapatero (2009).
In Panel B, for each individual stock i we estimate the rolling betas with respect to the orthogonal income return of the state where the firm headquarters are located, the orthogonal country labor income return and the stock market return, using nine years of rolling observations (thirty-six quarters):
Both the country and state factors carry a negative and significant price of risk. The size of the orthogonal state labor income, -0.174, is similar to the price of risk estimated in (7) , -0.198, and also significant at the 2.5%. As a robustness test, the state orthogonal income is replaced with the orthogonal divisional labor income. Both the orthogonal state and country prices of risk reported in Panel C decrease marginally but they remain strongly significant. These results suggest that both deviations from the Joneses consumption at the local (divisional) and country level are priced in the data.
One way to disentangle both effects is to test the model division by division. In Table 7 Panel D we report the cross-sectional prices of risk on the orthogonal country labor income estimated using only stocks within each division. In all divisions the price of risk is negative and strongly significant. It is worth noting that the size of these premia is very uniform across divisions, consistent with the country-wide nature of the Joneses risk considered in this test. When we include the orthogonal state labor income return in the cross-sectional regressions (Panel E), we observe that the risk premia on the orthogonal state risk factor vary widely from division to division, consistently with the divisional tests in the previous section. Five of the orthogonal state factors (MA, SA, PA, ES, WS) carry a negative premium significant at least at the 5% level.
These tests corroborate the country-wide evidence in favor of the KEEPM already documented in Gómez, Priestley and Zapatero (2009) . Moreover, consistently with the evidence accumulated in this paper, they show that together with the hedging demand against the risk of deviating from the country-wide Joneses consumption, there exists a local hedging component that varies in magnitude and power across divisions.
Conclusions
Mayers (1972) pointed out the importance of human capital as a component of aggregate wealth. Following up on that hint, the finance literature has used labor income as an indicator of human capital and linked it to the cross-section of stock returns. In this paper, we show that relative wealth concerns can explain the link between labor income and stock returns. Gómez, Priestley and Zapatero (2009) show that relative wealth/income concerns, whether driven by keeping up with the Joneses preferences or local price inflation hedging, can affect equilibrium prices through the hedging strategy of investors. In addition, the risk-premium associated with the risk factor (labor income) is negative. We show that the predictions of their model hold at the US census divisions level. In particular, the risk premium associated with labor income is negative and, even more importantly, the risk factor is strongly local, as consistent with the economic nature of relative wealth concerns. In this respect, we show that the risk premium associated with aggregate (country level) risk is negative and statistically significant. However, our tests support the strong significance of the additional risk -with respect to the aggregate/domestic factor-embedded in the local/divisional risk factor.
We also document that the empirical implications of the model vary across different regions, depending on the size of the risk factor and its variability, as predicted by the model.
In general, local labor income has higher correlation with local stock returns than with stock returns of other divisions, as we show in this paper. However, as we clearly document, the pricing factor is the correlation between stock returns and labor income, and not geographic location. This is clearly different from the notion of familiarity suggested in the literature as a possible factor in portfolio choice.
with θ k = w 0 k 1+w 0 k , the workers initial wealth as a proportion of the division's total wealth (investor's plus non-diversifiable wealth).
Notice that even if there is a friction (θ k > 0) that prevents full risk-diversification for a set of agents (the workers), investors will hold well diversified portfolios unless they exhibit some degree of keeping up with the Joneses behavior (γ k > 0). Thus, it is important to emphasize that investors' portfolios will be locally biased if and only if both keeping up with the Joneses behavior and a market friction exist.
Endogenous keeping up with the Joneses preferences
In this section, we discuss the endogenous keeping up with the Joneses preferences presented in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) . In this specification agents consume two types of goods: c, which has the interpretation of a global good, and w k , a local good, like housing services. Utility over consumption for these two goods is given by:
The parameter δ > 0 specifies the relative importance of the local good. All consumption takes place at the end of the period. At time t = 0, investors are endowed with shares of the firm that produces the global good. Call c 0 k the aggregate value of those shares at the beginning of the period for agents in division k. For simplicity, let c 0 k = 1 in all divisions. Workers in each division will receive a fixed numberw k of units of the local good at time t = 1. In equilibrium, the relative price of the local good in terms of the global good at t = 1 is given by p k = δ c k w k α . As it would be expected, the scarcer the (fixed) local good endowment relative to the (stochastic) global good consumption, the higher the relative price of the former. The investor's hedging demand for this risk will trigger the endogenous keeping up with the Joneses behavior in this model. Financial markets are complete.
If workers can not diversify their endowment risk (due, for instance, to short-selling constraints and moral hazard), Proposition 2 in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) shows that the representative investor's marginal utility is given by:
Let p 0 = δ c 0 w α denote the relative price at t = 0 of one unit of the non-diversifiable, local good endowment of workers at time t = 1. Recall that we normalized the initial investor's shares endowment c 0 = 1. Hence, p 0 = δw −α . The present value of the workers endowment is thereforew 0 = δw 1−α .
In this model, the relative wealth at t = 0 of the workers in division k as a proportion of the total division wealth is given by θ k =w 0 k 1+w 0 k . Callw k p k /w 0 k the return on the workers wealth (in units of the global good) over the period. Like in the exogenous preferences specification, under complete (financial) markets, there exists a portfolio X w k such thatw k p k w 0 k = R + r X w k . After these definitions, we can write the approximate function for division k investor's optimal portfolio as follows:
Notice that, in this model, the optimal portfolio for the logarithmic investor (α = 1) coincides with the benchmark, well diversified portfolio Ω −1 E(r). No relative wealth concern arises even in the presence of local, non-diversifiable wealth. Only for α > 1 should we observe a local bias in portfolio holdings. Table 1 Individual Stocks The KEEPM model: Aggregate
Let r F s,t denote the orthogonal labor income return in state s and period t; r erm,t denotes the return on the aggregate, country stock market index. For each individual stock i we estimate the rolling betas with respect to the orthogonal labor income return from the state where the stock headquarters are located and the stock market return, using nine years of rolling observations (36 quarters). The slope coefficientβ F i is estimated for every stock in the US. Every time a new year of quarterly data is added, the first (oldest) year is removed and the process is repeated. The time series of quarterly estimated betas starts in 1965Q1 and ends in 2011Q4.
We then run cross-sectional regressions at each quarter of all US individual stock returns on their estimated betas:
The Table 2 Beta-sorted portfolios Time-series regressions: Aggregate US stocks are sorted according to their slope coefficientsβ F i estimated in Table  1 into three, ten and twenty equally weighted portfolios denoted by subscript p. The quarterly return on these portfolios is estimated over the following year. The time series of quarterly portfolio returns starts in 1965Q1 and ends in 2011Q4.
Panel A reports the average percentage return on the difference between the portfolio that includes the stocks with the highest betas (P1) and the portfolio with the lowest betas (P3, P10 and P20, respectively). Absolute t-statistics that test whether the difference between the two portfolios is different from zero are reported in parenthesis.
We next estimate an aggregate factor mimicking (FM) portfolio for the orthogonal state labor income risk by going long on the top portfolio containing one-third of the stocks with the highest beta (P1) and short on the bottom portfolio containing one-third of the stocks with the lowest beta (P3). Let r F M t denote the return on the factor mimicking portfolio. Panel B reports the average returns on the 20 beta-sorted portfolios, the correlation coefficient ρ between each portfolio return and the return on the factor mimicking portfolio, and the coefficient from the following regression (absolute t-values in parenthesis): 
across portfolios p. As testing portfolios we use the 20 state beta-sorted portfolios from Table 1 Panel B plus the twenty-five Fama-French portfolios sorted first by size from smaller (FF1) to larger (FF21) and sorted then within each quintile by book-to-market from lower to higher.β erm is the estimated beta for the market risk factor;β f is the estimated beta for the risk factor f . In each specification, we estimate and report the average cross-sectional (percentage) prices of risks. In Panel A.1 we estimate the market portfolio price of risk, λ erm , from the CAPM. In Panel A. We also report a test of whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. This is a Chi-sq test given as α cov( α) −1 α, where α is the vector of average pricing errors across the forty-five portfolios and cov is the covariance matrix of the pricing errors. p-values in brackets. First, stocks are sorted into divisions according to the location of the company's headquarters. We then follow the same procedure described in Table 1 and estimate the slope coefficientβ F i for every stock i with respect to the orthogonal labor income return from the state where the stock headquarters are located. We then run the contemporaneous Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions at each period t across stocks i in each division k:
Panel A reports the average (percentage) prices of risk λ 0 k , λ F k and λ erm k for each division k. Absolute t-values are reported in parenthesis. In Panel B we repeat the same procedure as in Panel A but, in this case, the orthogonal state labor income is replaced with the orthogonal divisional labor income. Simultaneously, the betas in each division are estimated using all stocks in the US, regardless of the location of their headquarters. Table 4 into three and ten equally weighted portfolios denoted by subscript p. The quarterly return on these portfolios is estimated over the following year. The time series of estimated quarterly returns starts in 1966Q1 and ends in 2011Q4.
Average prices of risk
Panel A reports, for each division, the average percentage return on the difference between the portfolio that includes the stocks with the highest betas (P1) and the portfolio with the lowest betas (P3 and P10, respectively). Absolute t-statistics that test whether the difference between the two portfolios is different from zero are reported in parenthesis. In Panel B we repeat the same procedure as in Panel A but, in this case, the orthogonal state labor income is replaced with the orthogonal divisional labor income. Simultaneously, the betas in each division are estimated using all stocks in the US, regardless of the location of their headquarters.
Panel C reports the average percentage return on the ten portfolios constructed with the orthogonal state income betas. Absolute t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We next estimate, for each division, a factor mimicking (FM) portfolio for the orthogonal state labor income risk by going long on the top portfolio containing one-third of the stocks with the highest beta (P1) and short on the bottom portfolio containing one-third of the stocks with the lowest beta (P3) in the division. Let r F M k,t denote the return on the factor mimicking portfolio from division k. Panel D reports, for each division, the coefficient from the following regression (absolute t-values in parenthesis): Table 6 Beta-sorted portfolios Cross-Sectional regressions: Per division Panel A presents the covariances (lower triangular matrix), variances (diagonal), and correlations (upper triangular matrix) amongst the divisional factor mimicking portfolios defined in Table 5 .
In Panel B, we estimate in each division the contemporaneous Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions at each period t: across portfolios p in each division k. As testing portfolios we use the ten state beta-sorted portfolios from Table 5 Panel C.β erm is the estimated beta for the market risk factor;β f is the estimated beta for the risk factor f . In each specification, we estimate and report the average cross-sectional (percentage) prices of risks. In Panel B.1 we test the KEEPM. In Panel B.2 we test the KEEPM augmented with the Fama-French factors (KEEPM-FF). R 2 , pricing errors (p.e.) and the p.e. Test are defined in Table 3 . Absolute t-values in parenthesis; p-values in brackets. MA  NE  SA  EN  PA  ES  WS  WN  MO  MA 0 .0037 0.4350 0.6546 0.4264 0.4546 0.3731 0.5446 0.5543 0.3088 NE 0.0015 0.0033 0.4059 0.3648 0.4670 0.1965 0.4785 0.3655 0.2474 SA 0.0030 0.0018 0.0059 0.5041 0.5047 0.2699 0.5840 0.5214 0.2533 EN 0.0012 0.0009 0.0018 0.0022 0.5040 0.3422 0.4388 0.4810 0.2584 PA 0.0025 0.0025 0.0036 0.0022 0.0086 0.2480 0.6460 0.5496 0.1620 ES 0.0020 0.0010 0.0018 0.0014 0.0021 0.0083 0.3369 0.2663 0.1353 WS 0.0030 0.0025 0.0041 0.0018 0.0055 0.0028 0.0083 0.5729 0.2675 WN 0.0020 0.0013 0.0024 0.0013 0.0031 0.0015 0.0032 0.0038 0.2286 MO 0.0017 0.0013 0.0018 0.0011 0.0014 0.0011 0.0023 0.0013 0.0089 Let r C t denote the orthogonal country labor income return in the US in period t; r erm,t denotes the return on the aggregate, country stock market index. For each individual stock i we estimate the rolling betas with respect to the orthogonal country labor income return and the stock market return, using the same procedure as in Table 1 :
Panel A: Variances, Covariances and Correlations
The slope coefficientsβ C i andβ erm i are estimated for every stock in the US. The time series of quarterly estimated betas starts in 1965Q1 and ends in 2011Q4. We then run the contemporaneous Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions at each period t across stocks i:
Panel A reports the average (percentage) prices of risk λ 0 , λ C and λ erm . Absolute t-values are reported in parenthesis. In Panel B, for each individual stock i we estimate the rolling betas with respect to the orthogonal income return of the state where the headquarters are located, the orthogonal country labor income return and the stock market return, using nine years of rolling observations (thirty-six quarters):
In Panel C the state orthogonal income is replaced with the orthogonal divisional labor income. Each panel reports the corresponding cross-sectional (percentage) prices of risk. Panels D and E repeat the analysis within each division. In Panel D, only orthogonal country income is considered. In Panel E we include the orthogonal state risk factor in each division. In both cases, only stocks within each division are included.
Country-wide orthogonal income
Panel A: All US stocks λ 0 λ C λ erm 1.797 (3. 
